Is it possible to spare SAMIDRC from the fate of previous peacekeeping missions?

SADC member states must ensure that the operation in eastern DRC can overcome the challenges faced by its predecessors.

Almost a year since deployment, prospects for the success of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) look bleak. Even with its direct offensive mandate, the mission could suffer the same fate as previous operations in eastern DRC.

Since 1999, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the Regional Force of the East African Community and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) have tried unsuccessfully to restore peace.

Instead, in the case of MONUSCO, their efforts are known for respecting human rights. violations and failure to address local problems in an area where more than 120 violent militia groups operate. These include the M23 rebel group, which has come to power in eastern DRC since 2012. report In July, it emerged that the group was supported by troops from Rwanda and Uganda, a claim both countries deny..

In May 2023 SADC authorized SAMIDRC stabilized the region by giving it an offensive mandate to engage in direct combat with armed groups. The mission’s target strength was 5,000 troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, but only 1,300 were deployed.

The SAMIDRC funding mechanism reveals both the ambitions and limitations of regional peace initiatives in Africa. The mission’s annual expenses amounted to rated worth US$500 million, with South Africa contributing US$100 million and the DRC US$200 million. While this demonstrates regional ownership, significant funding gaps make success difficult.

SAMIDRC’s target strength was 5,000 troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, but only 1,300 were deployed.

To support SAMIDRC, the UN Security Council authorized the creation partnership with MONUSCO on operations, intelligence sharing and technical cooperation. SAMIDRC can make use of MONUSCO’s well-developed infrastructure, including vital logistics and military capabilities, such as air capabilities to enable medical evacuations.

Despite this support, SAMIDRC, like previous missions, has made insufficient progress in stabilizing the region.

SAMIDRC’s rules of engagement provide the necessary balance between offensive and defensive actions and the protection of civilians. However, lack of funding as well as shortages of troops and equipment have hampered operations, as has happened to MONUSCO and East African forces. As a result, SAMIDRC struggles to identify and respond to immediate threats (while integrating armed groups into civilian areas) and retake territory.

In contrast, M23 took control of strategic locations such as Masisi and Rutshuru, displacing many civilians in the process. Rebel groups have also committed gross human rights violations. violations including murder, sexual violence and robbery, which disproportionately affects women and children.

In the first half of 2024 alone, brutal conflict in the country displaced more than two million people, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. reports. Rwandan forces are fighting alongside M23, according to Human Rights Watch. have “displaced persons camps subject to indiscriminate shelling” around Goma during 2024. These gross violations include more than 1,800 children recruited rebel groups last year.

Concerns about SAMIDRC’s capabilities are compounded by questions about its legitimacy. SADC has been called “reckless” for deploying troops in the face of serious capacity problems. Although exact numbers are difficult to come by, the mission has already expenses the lives of more than 15 soldiers, many more captured by the M23 rebels this year.

Concerns about SAMIDRC’s capabilities are compounded by questions about its legitimacy.

Rwanda against lack of consultation when deploying forces. He asked the African Union to withdraw its support for SAMIDRC, arguing that its presence would escalate tensions in the conflict.

At a September workshop organized by the Institute for Security Studies, local civil society groups and communities in eastern DRC also questioned SAMIDRC’s ability to manage the complex dynamics of the conflict.

“For the people of Goma there is also the problem of the large number of all these regional forces deployed on Congolese soil,” said one of the seminar participants. “People are wondering how many more foreign armies will be present in the country. This discredits the credibility of… the FARDC. Many reject the increased presence of foreign armies.”

Allegations of sexual misconduct also undermine confidence in the mission. Recent reports suggest SAMIDRC employees impregnated local women, claiming soldiers paid a “divorce fee” to avoid lawsuits or sanctions. These reports follow story paradise sexual exploitation and abuses by peacekeeping forces in the country and show that security is not linked to sustainable humanitarian and development initiatives.

The conflict reflects a complex web of competing interests over the country’s resources, involving multiple armed groups as well as national and regional actors. This complicates the task of SAMIDRC, as is the case with MONUSCO and other missions.

SADC member states have failed to fully deploy the force and address its structural problems.

In the case of SAMIDRC, SADC member states failed to fully deploy the force and address its structural problems. MONUSCO support is not enough to compensate for the lack of finance, infrastructure and personnel – without which the force has little chance of success against well-armed rebel groups and Rwandan troops.

To address some of these challenges, SAMIDRC deployed a training team to ensure force interoperability during joint operations with the DRC Army. While SAMIDRC serves as a focal point, success depends on all participants working with MONUSCO, local communities and civil society organizations.

Without an urgent solution to its problems, SAMIDRC is likely to join the list of failed interventions in eastern DRC. The force must be increased to its full target strength, and SADC and its member countries must ensure adequate supplies, equipment and training. This will require dialogue and re-mobilization of support for the mission.

It is also worth considering whether SAMIDRC’s mandate should include humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts.

On the ground, SAMIDRC leaders need to ensure that justice and accountability mechanisms are in place for abuses and sexual exploitation of vulnerable groups. The mission should engage with local authorities, civil society representatives and communities to understand their concerns while promoting cooperation.

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