How will the US react to a nuclear Iran?

On the other hand, the Israeli Prime Minister had a good week. Benjamin Netanyahu has pleased his allies in both America and the Gulf by refraining from attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and oil refineries. But containment was restored. Israeli warplanes not only disabled Iran’s air defense systems and dealt painful blows to its missile production facilities. They also made it clear that Israel knows where Tehran’s strategic vulnerabilities are and can destroy them any time it wants.

After a difficult year, Biden’s team can breathe a sigh of relief. The American elections will not take place against the backdrop of a global energy crisis or US involvement in a war in the Middle East.

The strikes underscored a key point in the balance of power in the Middle East that has held since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. A military force with access to U.S. military technology and intelligence-gathering capabilities could wipe the floor on a military that relies on Moscow. Russian military technology has its uses, but American technology remains the gold standard in the defense world, especially for a country like Israel that has significant intelligence and technological capabilities.

This fact became the basis for the peace and stability that has existed in the Middle East since Henry Kissinger served as Secretary of State. But military power can only do so much. Unless it is used in the service of a workable political program, as Napoleon learned to his cost, even a series of victorious wars will not bring you peace.

Despite the impressive achievements in the headlines, Israel has a long way to go in this war. Fighting in the Gaza Strip has been ongoing for much longer and has been much bloodier than Israel had hoped, and Hezbollah has resisted stubbornly in the north. A long war in Lebanon will not be good for Israel’s economy or its global image, and the future of endless counterterrorism operations in the Gaza Strip will not be ideal. Iran’s strategy of advancing its regional agenda by mobilizing proxies who threaten both Israel and the Gulf Arabs has been tested but not broken by the fighting.

As long as the Islamic Republic of Iran remains a serious and unapologetic anti-Israel contender for hegemony in the Middle East, Jerusalem must fight on the fronts and at the time of Iran’s choosing. Worse, Israel needs American help in any prolonged war with Iran. This is a big problem. Regardless of whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump wins next week’s presidential election, the US in 2025 will likely be more interested in avoiding war in the Middle East than in helping Israel deal with the mullahs once and for all.

Israel’s ability to strike Iran and its allies has essentially weakened Iran’s allies with impunity, degraded its military strength, and damaged the regime’s prestige. There are two key questions now. Will Tehran resort to a nuclear breakthrough to compensate for the inferiority of its conventional weapons? If this happens, will the fear of Iranian nuclear weapons be enough to force Washington to support Israel, even at the risk of drawing Washington into another war?

The nuclear breakout option seems easier for Tehran to implement and more strategically attractive than ever before. Iran’s initiatives, from uranium enrichment to bomb development and missile production, have brought Tehran to the brink of creating a true nuclear capability. And Israel’s extraordinary strikes against Iran and its proxies demonstrate the limits of Iran’s ability to compete in the non-nuclear domain.

What America will do with a nuclear Iran is a difficult question. Very few people in the US want another war in the Middle East. However, without American assistance, it is quite possible that Israel’s only military option against a heavily fortified, regionally dispersed, and deeply entrenched Iranian nuclear program will involve Israeli use of nuclear weapons. Will Israel threaten to use nuclear weapons against Iran as a last resort if Washington does not help Israel block the program through conventional means? And will this threat, covert or overt, be enough to overcome any reluctance in Washington to help Israel dismantle its nuclear facilities using conventional weapons?

As I already wrote, 2025 will be an interesting year.