Hybrid warfare and national security: NATO, USA and the West

In early September 2024, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that it had disrupted thirty-two Internet domains operated as part of the Russian government’s disinformation campaign known as the “Disinformation Campaign.”Doppelganger” Two-year campaign target Americans and Europeans used a combination of false domain names and cloned websites, and also targeted social networks created in cyberspace.

That same month, the Justice Department charged two Russian nationals with “conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and conspiracy to commit money laundering” for a Russian state media company based in the city. Tennessee. In a Justice Department statement, Attorney General Merrick Garland accused two US agents of conducting “10 Million Dollar SchemeThe announcement, according to Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, was intended to “unlawfully manipulate American public opinion by sowing discord and division.”

The threat of Russian cyberattacks directed at the West is increasing, somewhat reminiscent of non-kinetic methods of hybrid warfare. used during the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulson highlighted the unprecedented number and scale of cyber attacks against his country at the region-wide 2024 NORDEFCO meeting. (The Nordic Defense Cooperation is a defense alliance that includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.) The Minister announced that the Danish Center for Cyber ​​Security (CFCS) increased threat level due to the rise of Russian cyber threats. “Increasingly,” he said, “we see a Russia that is willing to challenge NATO countries through sabotage, influence campaigns and cyber attacks.”

Russian tools

Throughout its history, Russia has practiced a hybrid strategy of military-political warfare. He adapted this strategy to modern times, using technology, culture, and asymmetrical tactics to escalate geopolitical tensions, seeking to put together the right combination to achieve the desired effect.

The rapid development and expansion of technological tools, including social networks and artificial intelligence, has allowed Russia to continually exploit critical infrastructure weaknesses. One of the powerful features of these hybrid attacks is their psychological aspect. Distributed information flows undermine democratic decision-making by challenging generally accepted social principles while promoting alternative realities. Gaps in technology and differences between allies provide opportunities for adversaries to use non-kinetic actions to achieve strategic goals.

One example of this strategy in action was seen in 2019, when NATO deployed a “counter-hybrid support team” to Montenegro. hold back Hybrid challenges of Russia. But in 2022, Montenegro suffered a cyber attack that “crippled government digital infrastructure,” and Defense Minister Rasko Konevic blamed Russia. Membership in NATO, the FBI, the UK and France has helped Montenegro recover, build stronger cyber capabilities and resist further Russian pressure. A government supported by the West has been formed in Montenegro.

What makes hybrid wars difficult to win is the fact that they have no forward presence or front lines and operate in “complex conflict landscapes” and “gray areas”. With the advent of the Internet, smartphones, artificial intelligence, and interconnected digital networks, physical national borders provide only partial protection. In the ever-changing cyberspace, the concept of peace does not exist. “The tools or instruments used or combined together to initiate hybrid warfare are often difficult to distinguish, attribute or confirm,” wrote Arsalan Bilal NATO overview. This opens the door to “plausible deniability” of hidden failures, which may be either permanent or designed to have future consequences.

During the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin made extensive use of electronic warfare. including jamming of GPS and satellite navigation systems signals. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said Russia’s hybrid warfare had forced the closure of the country’s largest airport, while noting that the Kremlin’s interference was also affecting civilian infrastructure in neighboring Latvia, Lithuania and facilities in Finland, Poland and Germany.

Information warfare and legality

In 2018, special counsel Robert Mueller concluded that while Russia did not alter actual voting results in the 2016 U.S. presidential race, it targeted voter registration in 21 states and spread conspiracies on social media to fuel discord. In June 2023, the Kremlin broken several European banking institutions, including the European Investment Bank, in response to Ukraine’s support for Europe. In November of the same year, Denmark suffered its largest ever cyber attack when twenty two energy companies were closed. In February 2024, Russian hackers injected malware on the servers of the embassies of Poland, Germany and Ukraine to collect information about the military activities of Europe and Iran.

In another strategy, Russia is using its legal presence in the Norwegian Svalbard archipelago, based on a 1920 treaty, to wage hybrid warfare through law. He has threatened Norway’s sovereignty by challenging that country’s environmental regulations and the internationally recognized territorial boundaries of Svalbard – actions that reflect the Kremlin’s maritime Arctic strategy. In total Russia hybrid warfare initiatives identify strategic intent to change global power dynamics and redefine the current and changing post-World War II rules-based order.

Need for Integrated Capabilities

The 2024 NATO Summit highlighted the extent to which cyber attacks have become a feature of modern conflicts and expressed the intention to “strengthen and protect allied networks, improve situational awareness, enhance cooperation and interoperability” and realize cyberspace as an operational domain. The central question in the unfolding debate is whether a cyber attack on a NATO country could trigger the mutual guarantee of defense under Article 5. Not all NATO allies have sufficient cyberattack and associated capabilities to prevent, respond to, or defend against cyberattacks, which places the alliance and its individual member countries in “…uncharted waters” As Russia, China and other adversaries push deeper into critical cyberspace infrastructure, the Western Security and Resilience Alliance must deepen my own offensive-defensive capabilities as dual and unconventional adversary presences evolve.

There is a growing sense that the West must ensure tight integration of cyber capabilities, as well as building trust and interoperability among allies, to enable deeper cooperation despite commercial and political gaps. Only in this way can the United States and its allies prevail against their common adversaries in the rapidly changing landscape of hybrid warfare.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.