Moon Chung-in on Ukraine, the Korean Peninsula and the US presidential election – The Diplomat

This is a tense moment for the Korean Peninsula. There are widespread reports that North Korean troops massaging in Russiapresumably to participate in the war against Ukraine. On October 31, Pyongyang held a meeting. first ICBM test in 2024reaffirming that the North “will never change its line of building up its nuclear forces.” And all this is happening against the backdrop of the US presidential elections, which create uncertainty regarding Washington’s future policies.

In this exclusive interview, we spoke with Dr. Moon Jong-in to explore the implications of the presence of North Korean troops in Russia and how the US presidential election could change the geopolitical landscape in Europe and Northeast Asia.

Moon is the James Laney Distinguished Professor at Yonsei University, vice chair of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, and editor-in-chief of Global Asia. He served as an advisor to three South Korean presidents and was widely recognized for his expertise in inter-Korean relations and international security.

What do you think about reports about the presence of North Korean troops in Russia?

Debate continues in South Korea about the nature of North Korea’s involvement. For example, the Department of Defense says it is sending personnel to Russia, but the National Reconnaissance Service calls it sending troops. Personnel, of course, can mean the engineering department or any other support personnel. On the other hand, troops mean that real soldiers are being sent to Russia.

Another debate revolves around whether this qualifies as a true military deployment. This is because North Korean military personnel currently training in regions such as Khabarovsk or Vladivostok wear Russian military uniforms and are under Russian jurisdiction. If this is the case, then it would be more accurate to call them mercenaries, like Wagner’s forces.

Ultimately, we will have to wait and see whether North Korean soldiers will appear in war zones such as Kursk or Donbass, and what their mission will be.

Will this change Russia’s combat strategy?

President Vladimir Putin has made clear that the participation of North Korean troops will be symbolic rather than strategic. Firstly, there is a language barrier. Secondly, the weapon systems used in the two countries are different. Finally, even the doctrinal orientation of the two militaries diverges. Therefore, it is very difficult for the North Korean armed forces to integrate into the Russian system. The value on the battlefield seems minimal to me.

Will South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol respond by supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine?

President Yoon has taken a strong stance in response to reports of North Korean military intervention in Russia. But in reality, Yoon has limited options. It is prohibited from transferring lethal weapons to countries in conflict, namely Ukraine, as the law prohibits such actions. The Yoon administration can certainly win approval from the National Assembly, but since the opposition party holds a majority of seats, it will be incredibly difficult.

The opposition does not want South Korea to be drawn into the war in Ukraine.

When it comes to the potential deployment of our troops, legislative approval is also required. But this would be practically impossible.

Yoon may take a rhetorical stance, but he will face enormous difficulties at home in fulfilling his commitment.

How does South Korean society perceive the current situation?

Just yesterday (October 25), a public opinion poll showed that almost 80 percent of respondents oppose the transfer of lethal weapons to Ukraine. But as for humanitarian assistance, about 65 percent supported it.

Overall, however, there is no public support for deeper South Korean involvement in Ukraine. And this is common sense. Even in a hypothetical Taiwan Strait crisis, should South Korea provide military assistance to Taiwan, the US and Japan? More than 60 percent of South Koreans say no. We should take a neutral position. I believe that logistical support is possible, but military intervention will be the subject of intense domestic political debate.

There is also concern that South Korea’s growing support for Ukraine could, in turn, trigger major boomerang effects such as Moscow’s military support for Pyongyang, including the transfer of critical military technologies related to the return of intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, military satellites, and nuclear weapons. submarines. If this happens, it will have serious negative consequences for the Korean Peninsula. So many South Koreans are calling for a more prudent and cautious approach.

Does closer relations between North Korea and Russia indicate a decrease in Chinese influence over North Korea?

China does not want the old Cold War structure to revive in Northeast Asia and be treated as a rogue state like North Korea and Russia. They also do not want tensions to rise on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. With the US presidential election approaching, leaders in Beijing will have to demonstrate good behavior to continue constructive dialogue with the new US president.

And that is why Pyongyang did not trust China and made a full bet on Russia. Therefore, it is only natural that China’s influence on North Korea is now limited.

How might the results of the US presidential election affect global conflicts?

If Donald Trump is re-elected, Europe could see big changes. Trump once said he would end the war in Ukraine within a week if he was re-elected. He is also proud of his personal ties to Putin. This way he may come up with a magic formula to end the war in Ukraine, although I doubt it. If Kamala Harris is elected, the situation in Ukraine will likely continue.

The conflict in the Middle East will continue no matter who ends up in the White House. As for Northeast Asia, there will also be no significant changes. Both Harris and Trump are likely to continue their bipartisan policy of encircling and containing China.

What about US policy towards North Korea?

Trump would be more accommodating to Kim Jong-un, while Harris would likely continue the Obama-Biden policy of strategic patience. But even if Trump offers a softer policy toward North Korea, I’m not sure Kim will be receptive this time. After the failure in Hanoi in February 2019, Kim’s distrust and dissatisfaction with Trump appears to be very high.

In fact, Kim is making a complete departure from his grandfather’s and father’s policies toward the United States, which were aimed at ensuring regime security and promoting economic development by normalizing diplomatic relations with the United States. The United States was then the “alpha and omega” of North Korean foreign policy. Now Kim says: “Forget about the US. We have found a new partner named Russia.”

Given this profound paradigm shift, I cannot be sure to what extent Kim is willing to accommodate Trump’s wishes for dialogue and engagement. Even if Trump offers concrete incentives acceptable to North Korea, Kim knows they can easily be thwarted by bureaucrats and politicians in Washington. Trump may try to use Russia to bring Kim back to the negotiating table. The question is whether Washington policy will tolerate Trump’s ties to Putin and his influence.

Is Nuclear North Korea the New Reality?

Regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons, we need to distinguish between recognition and awareness. We will never be able to recognize the country as a nuclear power because we must comply with the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). But we need to be aware that North Korea has nuclear weapons. This is a naked reality that we cannot deny.

In this sense, the idea of ​​CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling) seems unrealistic. As Dr. Siegfried Hecker suggests, our operational goal should be more practical, such as “halting, rolling back and long-term gradual dismantling” of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. Putting denuclearization at the entrance will be a failure.

It seems necessary to lower expectations and restore cognitive empathy towards North Korea. For example, in April 2018, Pyongyang voluntarily imposed a moratorium on nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests and did not conduct any tests until 2020. Instead of rewarding North Korea for this “good” behavior, the Trump administration imposed more than 40 additional sanctions on North Korea. North. The logic behind this was that two summits were sufficient reward for Kim Jong-un. This is poor one-sided reasoning without any strategic empathy. North Korea must have felt bitter and betrayed.

If sanctions are a tool to change North Korean behavior, they should be used more flexibly. I understand, of course, that all sanctions are codified and legally binding. However, the United States should develop ways to ease this rigidity and use sanctions as a flexible bargaining chip.