A-12 Avenger II: Flying Dorito stealth in a nutshell

What you need to know: The McDonnell Douglas A-12 Avenger II project is a cautionary tale of military overextension marked by costly delays, technical failures and strategic miscalculations. Conceived as a stealth bomber for the US Navy to replace the A-6 Intrumer, the Flying Dorito was ambitious but suffered from cost overruns and weight problems.

– After seven years and $5 billion, the project was canceled in 1991, a move supported by then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney as the Cold War waned.

– Legal battles ensued, making the A-12’s legacy one of the most significant program failures in US military history.

A $5 Billion Lesson: Why the US Navy’s Flying Dorito Stealth Bomber Failed

The saga of the McDonnell Douglas A-12 Avenger II is a stark reminder of the complexities and pitfalls associated with developing advanced military technology. In embarking on an ambitious attempt to create a carrier-based stealth bomber, the US Navy sought to significantly expand its air warfare capabilities. However, despite an investment of more than $5 billion, the project culminated not in a groundbreaking aircraft, but rather in a cautionary tale of budget overruns, technical problems and strategic mistakes.

The Flying Dorito That Never Flew: The Story of the A-12 Avenger II

Sitting near the entrance The Fort Worth Air Museum is a testament to the Pentagon’s extravagance is a full-scale mockup of the McDonnell Douglas A-12 Avenger II. More than $5 billion has been spent on the naval aviation program, and yet little can be said about it.

Not to be confused with the Lockheed A-12 program of the 1960s. This project was born in the early 1980s as part of the US Navy’s Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program. The goal was to develop a replacement for the Grumman A-6 Intrumer with an aircraft that would use stealth technology. Ultimately, billions of dollars were “invested” in these efforts.

By the end of 1984, design contracts had been awarded to two different teams: one to McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics; and another in Northrop, Grumman and Vought. After the last team left the project in 1988, McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics was selected to develop the new aircraft.

The warning lights should have gone out, but the efforts continued.

Named the Avenger II after the Grumman TBF/TBM torpedo bomber used during World War II, the A-12 was intended to be an all-weather carrier-based stealth bomber. It would also include more advanced stealth features than those used in F-117Aas well as significantly greater load capacity.

It was designed as a two-seater aircraft it will be capable of a top speed of 580 mph and have a blast radius of nearly 500 miles. Notably, it featured a flying wing design with a relatively small fuselage and minimal tail surface, which greatly reduced drag. The basic version was also developed for use as an anti-ship and close air support aircraft. The US Navy initially sought to acquire about 620 A-12s, while the US Marine Corps wanted an additional 238 aircraft, and the Air Force was even considering purchasing another 400 aircraft to replace aging F-111 Aardvark aircraft.

If 1,258 aircraft were built in total, the Avenger II would be the US military’s most numerous aircraft behind the US Army’s fleet of UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.

A-12 Avenger II: A, not F

The flying wing, intended for use aboard aircraft carriers, was actually not that big – just over 37 feet long and with a wingspan of only about 70 feet. This would allow the two aircraft to still sit side by side on adjacent catapults on the carrier’s flight deck. Its sharp, triangular shape quickly earned the A-12 the nickname “Flying Dorito.”

Although it could fly faster and further than the aircraft it was intended to replace, the compact size of the A-12’s flying wing meant that it could only carry about 5,150 pounds of internal ammunition, a far cry from the 18,000 pounds that carried the Intruder. . Rather than being a hard hit, the A-12 Avenger II was actually designed to hit targets without warning, rather than to cover up a target with bombing.

For these reasons, the US Navy even decided to use the “A” prefix to further demonstrate that the aircraft’s primary mission was against ground targets, even though the A-12 was to be armed with two internally stored AIM guided missiles. -120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. However, stealth, not dog fighting Capabilities were still intended to be the aircraft’s primary defense.

Crash and burn for A-12

The program was thought to be running smoothly, but in reality it was far behind schedule and significantly over budget. It took seven years and about $5 billion to complete, and the plane was not yet close to its first flight.

The significant problem was that the plane was too heavy, and its designers could not come to terms with this. Pentagon officials have essentially buried their heads in the sand, refusing to believe that the project is not going according to plan.

Another concern was the use of composite materials as well as repairability. Costs continued to rise, and eventually the Department of Defense said contractors simply would not be able to complete the program as planned. Then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney canceled the program entirely on January 7, 1991.

As Brent Eastwood previously reported for The National Interest“The Department of Defense has already invested $5 billion in the program, and the estimated unit cost of the aircraft has risen to $96 million per aircraft.”

This was not the bomber the US Navy needed at the time.

“Cheney saw it as an expensive albatross that got more expensive every year,” Eastwood added. “The Cold War was ending, and perhaps another bomber was simply not in the plans. Cheney probably believed that the number of bombers in the military was sufficient during Operation Desert Storm, and the Navy could make do with cruise missiles. considerations, he asked Congress to stop funding the A-12.”

Legal battles

In fact, this is not the end of the matter. Contractors were ordered to return about $2 billion spent on the program, a claim McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics disputed. The legal problems dragged on for more than a decade, and it was only after they reached the U.S. Supreme Court that the Department of Defense was ordered to return the money to the contractors.

When the program was canceled 30 years ago, it was the largest contract termination in Department of Defense history. become so expensive that in just three years it could absorb up to 70 percent of the US Navy’s aircraft budget.

Today there is only one layout left of this program.

Experience and knowledge of the author: Peter Suchiu

Peter Suchiu is a writer from Michigan. He has contributed in more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites, which have published more than 3,200 articles over a twenty-year career as a journalist. He writes regularly about military technology, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics and international affairs. Peter is also Co-author for Forbes and Registration of works. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can write to the author by email: (email protected).

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